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5 How Were Capital Inﬂows
Stimulated under the
Dollar Peg System?
Eiji Ogawa and Lijian Sun
5.1 Introduction
The Asian currency crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997 had
spread rapidly to other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries and the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIES) in Asia. Among
the aﬀected nations, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea faced the most severe
currency crises. Their governments requested ﬁnancial support from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It is commonly stated that the Asian currency crisis had the following
features (IMF 1997c, 1998; Ito 1999). First, the monetary authorities of
the aﬀected countries adopted an exchange rate policy of pegging the do-
mestic currency to the U.S. dollar with an extremely large weight. The de
facto dollar peg system inﬂuenced both the nation’s current and capital
accounts. An appreciation of the U.S. dollar had worsened the current
accounts under the de facto dollar peg system since May 1995.1 De facto
dollar pegging also made domestic borrowers and foreign lenders ignore
the risk of foreign exchange.
Second, macroeconomic variables, except for large current account
deﬁcits in Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea, were in sustainable condition
before the crisis. Neither budget deﬁcits nor decreases in foreign reserves
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were found—especially as compared to the past currency crises in Latin
America. Although growth rates of export revenues had abruptly gone
down in these countries since 1996, the large amounts of capital inﬂows
made the governments complacent about their current account deﬁcits.
Lastly, the currency crisis occurred simultaneously with a ﬁnancial crisis
which made some ﬁnancial intermediaries go bankrupt. The IMF (1997c,
1998) pointed out that in the background of the ﬁnancial crisis, there was
a fragile ﬁnancial sector. In an eﬀort to prevent further deterioration, the
IMF required the governments of the various countries to restructure their
ﬁnancial sectors as conditionality for receiving ﬁnancial support. Large
capital inﬂows to the countries with inadequate ﬁnancial institutions
brought about the ﬁnancial crisis.
According to Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997), there seems to
be a consistent relationship between ﬁnancial and currency crises in
emerging market countries. Indeed, in the past, currency crisis often oc-
curred along with ﬁnancial crisis. The literature on ﬁnancial and currency
crises has been classiﬁed into three groups. The ﬁrst group (Velasco 1987;
Dooley 1997; Calvo and Mendoza 1996) explains that a ﬁnancial crisis
brings about a currency crisis, whereas the second group (IMF 1997b;
Miller 1996) explains that a currency crisis causes a ﬁnancial crisis. The
third group (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993; Goldfajn and Valdes
1997) accounts for the possibility of a common external factor that brings
about both the ﬁnancial and currency crises at the same time—e.g., ﬂuc-
tuations of the world interest rate that inﬂuenced the ﬂow of international
capital to and from the domestic ﬁnancial markets triggered the Mexico
crisis in 1994.
This paper places emphasis on external factors as the cause of currency
and ﬁnancial crises. It focuses on ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate under
the de facto dollar peg system. In the 1990s, there were large swings of the
yen against the U.S. dollar; the yen rapidly appreciated during the early
1990s and depreciated after 1995. If the monetary authorities of a country
were to adopt a dollar peg system, the ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate of
the yen against the U.S. dollar would have caused the same ﬂuctuations in
the exchange rate of the yen against the relevant currencies.
This paper empirically analyzes how the de facto dollar peg system ad-
versely inﬂuenced capital inﬂows to the countries in crisis by studying the
relationship between the de facto dollar peg system and the capital inﬂows
to these countries. Focus is placed on countries that requested IMF ﬁnan-
cial support during the Asian crisis, namely, Thailand, Korea, and Indone-
sia. We regress capital ﬂows on explanatory variables such as interest rates,
foreign exchange risks, export growth rate, and rate of change in stock
prices. We then use an instrumental variable method to take into account
how the instrumental variables are inﬂuenced by other variables.
The estimated regression equations are then used to conduct a simula-
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tion analysis of how the capital inﬂows would have behaved had the mone-
tary authorities of these countries adopted a currency basket peg system
instead of the de facto dollar peg system. The currency basket peg system
would have increased ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate of the domestic
currency against the U.S. dollar, whereas it would have decreased the ﬂuc-
tuations of the exchange rate against the yen. Accordingly, a currency bas-
ket peg system would have changed the actual and the expected changes
in exchange rates, and led to a change in foreign exchange risks.
The simulation analysis generates the following results: A currency bas-
ket peg system would have had a depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to
Thailand and Korea during the analyzed period 1985–96. It would also
have had a slightly depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to Indonesia. In-
creases in foreign exchange risk against the U.S. dollar under a currency
basket peg system would have contributed most to the depressing eﬀect.
This is because the estimated foreign exchange risk variable against the
U.S. dollar is the most signiﬁcant variable among the explanatory variables
in the capital ﬂow equation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview of how
diﬀerent variables inﬂuence capital inﬂows to the Asian countries before
the crisis. In section 5.3, a simple model of capital inﬂows that consists of
a capital ﬂow equation with instrumental variables is set up. An instru-
mental variable method is then used to estimate the capital ﬂow equation.
We drop the instrumental variables that have a coeﬃcient with the wrong
sign and proceed to estimate the regression equations. In section 5.4, the
estimated regression equations are used to conduct a simulation analysis
of the capital inﬂows under the currency basket peg system. Simulated
values under the currency basket peg system are compared with estimated
values under the actual de facto dollar peg system. The simulation shows
how the dollar peg system inﬂuenced the capital inﬂows to these countries
and how a currency basket peg system would have inﬂuenced them. Fi-
nally, we summarize analytical results and conclude in section 5.5.
5.2 Capital Inﬂows before the Asian Currency Crisis
According to the classiﬁcation by the IMF (1997a), before the crisis, the
Asian countries with currencies attacked by speculation in 1997 had in
fact adopted exchange rate arrangements other than the dollar peg system.
The exchange rate arrangements in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea were
classiﬁed as the managed ﬂoat system. The exchange rate arrangement in
the Philippines was classiﬁed as an independent ﬂoat system. The exchange
rate system in Thailand was described as a basket peg system. Hong Kong
was the only one under the dollar peg system in the IMF’s classiﬁcation.
However, research by Frankel and Wei (1994), Kawai and Akiyama
(1998), and Kawai (1997) on the currency to which the monetary authori-
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ties of the Asian countries pegged their currencies suggests otherwise.
Frankel and Wei (1994) estimated the weights placed on major foreign
currencies in their exchange rate policy during the period 1979–92. Kawai
(1997) also estimated them during the period 1990–96 using the same
method as Frankel and Wei. The result of estimation is summarized in
table 5.1. For example, the weight on the U.S. dollar is 0.91 (Frankel and
Wei 1994) and 0.789 (Kawai 1997) for Thailand. The weight placed on
the U.S. dollar is nearly equal to one for Korea and Indonesia. Thus, the
estimation indicates that these three countries have indeed adopted the de
facto dollar peg system.
Next, we examine ﬂuctuation of the exchange rates of these currencies
against the U.S. dollar and the yen under the de facto dollar peg system.
Figure 5.1 shows movements in the exchange rates of the Asian currencies
against the U.S. dollar in the 1990s. The exchange rates in terms of the
U.S. dollar were relatively stable until July 1997. The Thai baht and the
Hong Kong dollar had been kept almost stable since 1990. The Malaysian
ringgit had been kept relatively stable although it had been perfectly
pegged to the U.S. dollar. The Korean won also had been kept relatively
stable. The Indonesian rupiah had been changing at a predictable and
constant rate because the monetary authorities had adopted a crawling
peg to the U.S. dollar.
Figure 5.2 shows movements in the exchange rates of these currencies
in terms of the yen. The exchange rates in terms of the yen underwent
more substantial ﬂuctuations compared to those against the U.S. dollar.
Although they had a tendency to depreciate against the yen from 1990 to
1995, all of the currencies have been appreciating against it since May
1995. The joint movements of the exchange rates in terms of the yen were
attributed to the de facto dollar peg system.
Table 5.1 Weights on the Dollar and the Yen in Exchange Rate Policies of
Asian Countries
Sample Period 1979–92 Sample Period 1990–96
Coeﬃcient on Coeﬃcient on Coeﬃcient on Coeﬃcient
the Dollar the Yen the Dollar on the Yen
Singapore 0.75 0.13 0.420a 0.021
Hong Kong 0.92 0.00 1.002 0.002
Korea 0.96 0.10 0.941 0.088
Malaysia 0.78 0.07 0.589 0.044
Thailand 0.91 0.05 0.789 0.104
The Philippines 1.07 0.01 1.087 0.094
Indonesia 0.95 0.16 0.966 0.014
Sources: Frankel and Wei (1994); Kawai (1997).
aCoeﬃcient on the SDR is 0.600.
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2. Frankel and Rose (1996) obtained a result that current account deﬁcits are insigniﬁcant
as a cause of currency crisis, as they were for the past currency crisis.
The vacillations in the exchange rates have had negative eﬀects on the
international trade competitiveness of these countries. Figure 5.3 shows
movements of the real eﬀective exchange rates of these countries. The real
eﬀective exchange rates of the Thai baht, the Malaysian ringgit, and the
Indonesian rupiah ﬂuctuated without any appreciating trends in the early
1990s. However, they began appreciating after May 1995. The Korean won
was the only one to be ﬂuctuating without any appreciating trend through-
out the period 1992–97. Thus, the real eﬀective exchange rates of the cur-
rencies except for the Korean won began appreciating since 1995. The de
facto dollar peg system and the depreciation of the yen against the U.S.
dollar inﬂuenced these movements in the real eﬀective exchange rates.
In the early 1990s, depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the yen depre-
ciated the countries’ currencies against the yen under the de facto dollar
peg system. Although these countries had trade deﬁcits due to increases
in imports of capital goods—which is a sign of good economic growth—
exports in these countries had been steadily increasing due to the deprecia-
tion of their currencies against the yen. Nevertheless, the depreciating
trend of the yen against the U.S. dollar after 1995 decreased the competi-
tiveness of these countries against Japan, and in turn, decreased growth
rates of export revenues. The movements of the export growth rates of Thai-
land, Korea, and Indonesia are shown in ﬁgure 5.4.
It is not so important whether or not a country has trade deﬁcits as long
as its imported capital goods continue to increase its future production
capacities and export revenues.2 However, if the export growth rate is de-
creasing at the present time and is expected to continue to decrease in the
future, the present trade deﬁcits will not be sustainable. The expectation
could trigger speculative attacks against the currency even if these coun-
tries are increasing their foreign reserves.
Private capital inﬂows to Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea increased in
the 1990s as shown in ﬁgures 5.5 to 5.7. The ﬁgures show that there was
an oversurge of capital inﬂows to all three countries in 1995 and 1996.
The oversurge of capital inﬂows to Thailand was mainly caused by other
investments, such as international bank loans. Figure 5.6 shows that port-
folio investments to Korea were larger than international bank loans in
1993 but that the opposite was true after 1994. Because private capital
inﬂows had reached their peak in 1996, the international bank loans pre-
vailed in the capital inﬂows to these Asian countries. This is the opposite
of the situation in Latin American countries, where the portfolio invest-
ments prevailed in the capital inﬂows.
Movements in ﬂows of international bank loans categorized by coun-
tries are shown in ﬁgures 5.8 through 5.10. In the case of Thailand, the
share of Japanese banks was relatively high in 1994 and 1995. European
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3. The expected depreciation rates of the home currency at each period are calculated by
assuming that economic agents use data on rates from the last ﬁve years to forecast exchange
rates as explained in the next section. Speciﬁcally, we use a time series model of the ARIMA
(1,1,1) process to forecast a value of the next period based on historical data of the last ﬁve
years for the relevant exchange rate.
4. Values in ﬁgure 5.11 are seasonally adjusted data of the exchange rate–adjusted interest
rate in terms of the U.S. dollar and the yen that are used in a regression analysis in section
5.3.
banks also increased their loans to Thailand in 1996. Although ﬂows of
international bank loans to Korea and Indonesia by European banks
seemed to be higher than Japanese banks, Kaminsky and Reinhart (chap-
ter 3, this volume) pointed out that Japanese banks had larger shares in
stocks of international bank loans in these three countries.
The impact of both the de facto dollar peg system and depreciation or
appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the yen on interest rates is exam-
ined. We calculate exchange rate adjusted foreign interest rates by adding
expected depreciation rates of the domestic currency to the relevant for-
eign interest rate.3
Figure 5.11 shows movements of exchange rate adjusted foreign inter-
est rates and domestic interest rates.4 The movements of the interest rates
had some common characteristics. Both the U.S. and the Japanese inter-
est rates tended to be lower than the domestic interest rates in the 1990s.
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Fig. 5.11 Interest rates: A, Thailand; B, Korea; C, Indonesia
A
Fig. 5.11 (cont.)
B
C
Moreover, the Japanese interest rates have been consistently lower than
the U.S. interest rates since 1995.
Before turning to regression analysis of the capital inﬂows, let’s look at
the timing between the surge of capital inﬂows and the asset bubbles in
these countries. The countries in crisis experienced asset bubbles in the
1990s during diﬀerent time periods as shown in ﬁgure 5.12. Thailand and
Indonesia experienced a bubble of stock prices in 1993. They had a peak
of stock prices in the latter half of 1993. The stock prices in Korea also
increased from 1993 through 1994. The stock prices in Thailand and Ko-
rea were kept at high levels during 1995. However, they started to drop
sharply after early 1996. In Indonesia, the stock prices continued to in-
crease until early 1997, but they also dropped sharply afterward. As
shown, the bubble and the peak of stock prices preceded the surge of
capital inﬂows in 1995 and 1996. Thus, we can conclude that no bubbles
in stock prices seemed to stimulate capital inﬂows to these countries.
5.3 Capital Inﬂows under the Dollar Peg System
5.3.1 A Simple Model of Capital Inﬂows
We ﬁrst conduct a regression analysis of capital inﬂows to the countries
under the de facto dollar peg system in order to analyze empirically how
the de facto dollar peg system inﬂuenced capital inﬂows to these countries.
We then set up a model of capital inﬂows to be estimated in a regression
analysis. The model consists of a capital ﬂow equation and equations that
explain some of the instrumental variables in the capital ﬂow equation.
In many developing countries including those in East Asia, monetary
authorities impose measures to control international capital ﬂows. There-
fore, capital ﬂows are caused by partial adjustments of capital asset stocks
to changing optimal levels. According to a portfolio-balance approach, the
risk-averse investors should attempt to hold optimal portfolio balances of
foreign assets denominated in terms of foreign currencies relative to do-
mestic assets denominated in terms of the home currency. The optimal
portfolio balances are determined by both relative expected return rates
and foreign exchange risks.
Thus, capital ﬂows are inﬂuenced by factors such as domestic interest
rate, exchange rate–adjusted foreign interest rates, and foreign exchange
risks. Positive exchange rate–adjusted interest rate diﬀerentials stimulate
capital inﬂows to these countries from the viewpoint of foreign lenders
and domestic borrowers. Signs of coeﬃcients of the domestic interest rates
are expected to be positive, and exchange rate–adjusted foreign interest
rates to be negative. Coeﬃcients of foreign exchange risks are also ex-
pected to be negative. Thus, foreign exchange risks depress economic
agents’ foreign lending and borrowing if they are risk averse.
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We also take into account the possible eﬀects that a rate of change in
domestic stock prices has on capital ﬂows. Increases in domestic stock
prices also stimulate foreign investors to invest in domestic stocks. Also,
they might encourage both domestic borrowers to borrow from abroad
and foreign lenders to lend to the domestic economy. Thus, coeﬃcients on
the variables should be positive.
Moreover, a higher export growth rate might give domestic borrowers
easier access to international capital because they are regarded to have
a higher capacity to repay their debt. Economies with higher economic
growth should have more sustainable levels of foreign debts according to
intertemporal macroeconomic models. In small developing countries, eco-
nomic growth tends to depend a lot on export growth. Thus, a higher
export growth rate might have positive eﬀects on capital inﬂows.
We regress capital ﬂows on the explanatory variables with a time lag to
take into account the causality between the explanatory variables and the
capital ﬂows. A ratio of capital ﬂow to nominal GDP is used in order to
eliminate an increasing trend in capital ﬂows. A capital ﬂow equation is
formalized below:
(1) cf risk risk
stock
usd hc/ usd hc/ usd
yen hc/ yen
t t t t t t
t t
t t t t t
t t t t
a a i a di a yi a d a y
a X a
di i E s s
yi i E s
t
= + + + + +
+ + +
≡ + −
≡ +
− − − − −
−
+
+
−
1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
7 1 8
1
1
1 log
{log[ ( )] log( )}
{log[ (
 ε
)] log( )},− st
hc/ yen
where cf is the ratio of capital ﬂows to nominal GDP, i is the domestic
interest rate, di is the exchange rate–adjusted U.S. interest rate, yi is the
exchange rate–adjusted Japanese interest rate, drisk is the foreign exchange
risk of exchange rate of domestic currency in terms of the U.S. dollar, yrisk
is the foreign exchange risk of exchange rate of domestic currency in terms
of the yen,  log X is the export growth rate, stock is the rate of change
in domestic stock prices, ε is the error term, i usd is the U.S. dollar–
denominated interest rate, i yen is the yen-denominated interest rate, shc/usd
is the exchange rate of domestic currency in terms of the U.S. dollar, shc/yen
is the exchange rate of domestic currency in terms of the yen, and E is the
expectation operator.
We regard the domestic interest rate, export growth rate, and rate of
change in stock prices to be the explanatory variables in the capital ﬂow
equation (1). We also assume that the variables are endogenous and inﬂu-
enced by exogenous variables.
A domestic interest rate is inﬂuenced by the above determinants of capi-
tal ﬂows in a small economy with international capital mobility.
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(2) risk riski b b di b yi b d b yt t t t t t= + + + + +1 2 3 4 5 ε
Interest rate arbitrage tend to make domestic interest rates move with
foreign interest rates in the same direction. Under perfect capital mobility,
coeﬃcients of exchange rate–adjusted foreign interest rates would be one.
However, it is not necessarily true under imperfect capital mobility. For-
eign exchange risks tend to make foreign lenders prefer domestic currency–
denominated assets to other currency–denominated assets. In contrast,
they tend to make domestic borrowers prefer domestic currency–denom-
inated liabilities to other currency-denominated liabilities. The preferences
of both foreign lenders and domestic borrowers make the domestic interest
rates of the crisis countries higher than the foreign interest rates by a risk
premium. Thus, coeﬃcients of the foreign interest rates and foreign ex-
change risks are expected to be positive.
Exports are regarded as a function of real exchange rates and foreign
incomes. Export growth rate is inﬂuenced by the depreciation rate of do-
mestic currency against the U.S. dollar and the yen, domestic inﬂation rate,
foreign inﬂation rate, and growth rate of foreign GDP. It is expected that
coeﬃcients of the depreciation rate of domestic currency and the foreign
inﬂation rate will be negative while those of domestic inﬂation rates and
growth rates of foreign GDP will be positive:
(3)
GDP
hc/ usd hc/ yen  

log log log *
log * ,
X c c s c s c c
c
t t t t t
t t
= + + + +
+ +
− − − −1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
6
 
ε
where  is the domestic inﬂation rate, * is the foreign inﬂation rate, and
 log GDP* is the growth rate of foreign GDP.
In addition, the domestic inﬂation rate is inﬂuenced by changes in ex-
change rates and foreign inﬂation rates through a pass-through eﬀect. It is
not necessary that coeﬃcients on depreciation rates of domestic currency
and foreign inﬂation rates will be one if there is imperfect pass-through.5
(4) hc/ usd hc/ yen t t t t td d s d s d= + + + +− − −1 2 1 3 1 4 1 log log * ε
Capital inﬂows might have stimulated domestic investors to invest in
domestic stocks. As a result, domestic stock prices might have increased.
However, stock prices would not have been inﬂuenced if the monetary
authorities sterilized increases in foreign reserves. We formulate the follow-
ing stock price equation to take into account the eﬀect on stock prices.
(5) cfstock t t te e= + +1 2 ε
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5. Krugman (1987) and Marston (1990) explained that imperfect pass-through eﬀects were
caused by exporting ﬁrms’ pricing to market.
5.3.2 An Analytical Method and Data
At ﬁrst, we use an instrumental variable method to estimate all of the
ﬁve equations. In our case, endogenous variables are the domestic interest
rate, export growth rate, domestic inﬂation rate, and rate of change in
stock prices. Economic variables in the foreign countries are exogenous
under the assumption of a small open economy. We further assume that
the monetary authorities can intervene in foreign exchange markets to con-
trol exchange rates. Accordingly, we assume that not only actual and ex-
pected depreciation rates of domestic currency, but foreign exchange risks
are also controlled by the monetary authorities although both the expected
depreciation rates and foreign exchange risks are perceived by investors
and might be forward-looking variables. Both are regarded as exogenous
policy variables.
Next, after we check the signs of coeﬃcients on export growth rate and
rate of change in stock prices in the capital ﬂow equations, we drop vari-
ables whose coeﬃcients have an incorrect sign. The instrumental variable
method is again used to estimate all of the equations for the selected in-
strumental variables. Interest rates and foreign exchange risks are kept as
explanatory variables in the second round of estimation because we want
to focus on the basic determinant variables of capital ﬂows.
It is diﬃcult but nevertheless important to generate a time series of ex-
pected exchange rates for countries where data on expected exchange rates
is unavailable. Here, we assume that both foreign lenders and domestic
borrowers act on the basis of expectations, and that foreign exchange risks
are calculated by using historical data on exchange rates, although we can-
not forecast the eﬀects that expected future events such as a peso problem
have on exchange rates. Data of the past ﬁve years from each period are
used to forecast exchange rates in the next period according to a time
series model (autoregressive integrated moving-average [ARIMA] 1,1,1).
The forecasted values are used as the expected exchange rate.
We use the forecasted values of exchange rates to calculate foreign ex-
change risks. We further assume that both foreign lenders and domestic
borrowers regard standard deviations of actual exchange rates from the
forecasted values as foreign exchange risks.6 Figure 5.13 shows movements
of foreign exchange risks in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. The foreign
exchange risks against the U.S. dollar were lower than those against the
yen over the analyzed period in all of these countries. All foreign exchange
6. We have another option to calculate foreign exchange risks. The foreign exchange risks
can be assumed to be standard errors of the time series model, i.e., deviations of actual
exchange rates from the estimated values. However, standard errors are almost unchanged
once a large devaluation of exchange rate occurs. We do not choose this calculation because
it is not natural for foreign exchange risks to remain unchanged for a period of time after
the large devaluation.
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risks were lower during the 1990s than during the 1980s. The foreign ex-
change risks against the yen jumped in 1993 and kept increasing from 1993
to 1995 in all three countries.
Quarterly data are used in all of the regression analyses due to data
constraints. Monthly data on the exchange rates are used in order to secure
a sample size for making an autoregression of the exchange rates according
to the ARIMA model. Monthly data are then converted to quarterly data
by simply averaging the data over a three-month period. We chose to ana-
lyze the period between the Plaza Agreements of September 1985 and the
Thai baht crisis of July 1997. Accordingly, the period lasts from the ﬁrst
quarter of 1986 to the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 for all three countries.
“Other investments” in the ﬁnancial account of the balance of payments
is used as the major proxy on capital inﬂows, because international bank
loans prevail in capital inﬂows to these countries. “Portfolio and other in-
vestments” is also present in Thailand and Korea. Data on portfolio invest-
ments are not available due to missing values in the data.
We add dummy variables that show a representative deregulation of
international capital transactions that are statistically signiﬁcant in ex-
plaining variables when estimating the capital ﬂow equations. In Thailand,
the Bangkok International Banking Facility opened in March 1993. In
Indonesia, regulations on foreign borrowings of ﬁnancial institutions were
removed in March 1989. Korea also had regulations on foreign borrowings
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Fig. 5.13 Foreign exchange risks (deviations from a forecast value)
of ﬁnancial institution removed in 1989. Accordingly, a dummy variable
is added from the second quarter of 1993 for Thailand, from the ﬁrst quar-
ter of 1989 for Korea, and from the second quarter of 1989 for Indonesia.
We select the United States and Japan as foreign inﬂuences for these
three countries because they trade heavily with the United States and Ja-
pan. As for both the foreign inﬂation rate and the growth rate of foreign
GDP, simple averages of the U.S. and Japanese data are calculated.
As for data on interest rates, we use money market interest rates such as
the call rates for Thailand and Indonesia because deposit interest rates
and loan interest rates are kept unchanged. A three-month commercial pa-
per (CP) interest rate is used for Korea, and a three-month London Inter-
bank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) is used for both Japan and the United States.
As for inﬂation rates, wholesale price indexes are used for Thailand, Indo-
nesia, and Japan, whereas producer price indexes are used for Korea and
United States.
All data except for stock prices are available from the International Fi-
nancial Statistics IMF CD-ROM. Data on stock price can be found in Data-
stream (http://www.datastream.com). When conducting the regression
analysis, seasonal adjustments were made for the data that require it. Re-
gressions are estimated by correcting for ﬁrst-order serially correlated er-
rors when necessary.
5.3.3 Results of the Regression Analysis
Capital Flow Equations
We use equation (1) to regress all capital inﬂows on interest rates, foreign
exchange risks, export growth rate, rates of changes in stock prices, and a
deregulation dummy for each country.
As for the other investments of Thailand, coeﬃcients on both the do-
mestic interest rate and foreign exchange risk against the U.S. dollar are
statistically signiﬁcant and in the correct signs, as shown in equation (1),
speciﬁcation (a) (henceforth equation [1a]; likewise equations [1b]–[1k],
etc.). Coeﬃcients on the U.S. interest rate, foreign exchange risk against
the yen, and rate of change in stock prices are also in the correct signs,
although they are statistically insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the export
growth rate is in the wrong sign, and the deregulation dummy is statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. As a result, both the export growth rate and deregula-
tion dummy are dropped from the capital ﬂow equation in the next round
of estimation.
In the second regression, we obtain the results shown in equation (1b)
in table 5.2. The results are almost the same as those of equation (1a).
P-value of both the domestic interest rate and the foreign exchange risk
against the U.S. dollar are lower than those in equation (1a). It is notewor-
thy that a responsiveness of capital ﬂows to the foreign exchange risk
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against the U.S. dollar is much larger compared to the foreign exchange
risk against the yen. It is expected that this asymmetry will induce capital
inﬂows to decrease under the currency basket peg system where the stan-
dard deviation for the U.S. dollar increases and the standard deviation for
the yen decreases.
As for the “portfolio and other investments” of Thailand, a result simi-
lar to “other investments” is obtained. Equation (1c) in table 5.2 shows
that coeﬃcients on both the domestic interest rate and the foreign ex-
change risk against the U.S. dollar are statistically signiﬁcant and of the
correct signs. The coeﬃcient on the export growth rate is signiﬁcant but of
the wrong sign, while the deregulation dummy is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Equation (1d) documents the results of regressing “portfolio and other
investments” without the export growth rate and deregulation dummy. The
coeﬃcient of the rate of change in stock prices becomes negative. This
variable is dropped from the capital ﬂow equation because its coeﬃcient
has an incorrect sign, and we obtain new results shown in equation (1e).
Coeﬃcients on both the domestic interest rate and the foreign exchange
risk against the U.S. dollar are statistically signiﬁcant and of the correct
sign.
As for both the “other investments” and the “portfolio and other invest-
ments” of Korea, coeﬃcients on the foreign exchange risk against the U.S.
dollar are statistically signiﬁcant and negative as expected. The deregula-
tion dummy is statistically signiﬁcant and positive, and the coeﬃcients on
the export growth rate and the rate of change in stock prices are of the
wrong sign.
As shown in table 5.3, we obtain capital ﬂow equations (1g) and (1i)
when we drop the export growth rate and the rate of change in stock prices
from equations (1f) and (1h). Coeﬃcients on the foreign exchange risk
against the U.S. dollar are negative while their p-values are lower than
those in equation (1f) and (1g). Coeﬃcients on the domestic interest rates
turn positive although the variable is statistically insigniﬁcant. A respon-
siveness of the capital ﬂows to the foreign exchange risk against the U.S.
dollar is greater than that against the yen.
In the case of Indonesia, a satisfactory capital ﬂow equation cannot be
obtained—especially, the variable of the export growth rate is statistically
signiﬁcant but of the wrong sign. A capital ﬂow equation is reestimated
after dropping both the export growth rate and the deregulation dummy
in equation (1j), but the result is the same.
The rate of change in stock price variables is statistically insigniﬁcant
regardless of the sign in the capital ﬂows equation for all three countries.
It implies that the rate of change in stock prices did not inﬂuence the
capital inﬂows to the countries. The result of the regression analysis is
consistent with our hypothesis that stock price bubbles did not stimulate
capital inﬂows to the countries.
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Other Estimation Equations
Results of estimating the equations relevant to the selected instrumental
variables are shown in table 5.4. The domestic interest rate and the rate of
change in stock prices are selected as instrumental variables in the case of
the “other investments” for Thailand, and only the domestic interest rate
is selected as an instrumental variable in the case of the “portfolio and
other investments” for Thailand. In equation (2a) with domestic interest
rate as the dependent variable, both variables of exchange rate–adjusted
foreign interest rates are statistically signiﬁcant and have a positive co-
eﬃcient, although they are not signiﬁcantly one. Equation (5a) with the
rate of change in stock prices as the dependent variable has no statistically
signiﬁcant variables, indicating that no external factors inﬂuenced the
stock prices.
In the case of Korea, only the domestic interest rate is selected as an
instrumental variable. In equation (2b), the exchange rate–adjusted Japa-
nese interest rate variable is statistically signiﬁcant. The exchange rate–
adjusted U.S. interest rates and the foreign exchange risk against the yen
are also relatively signiﬁcant (with p-value of approximately 0.11).
Domestic interest rate, export growth rate, and domestic inﬂation rate
are selected as instrumental variables in the case of Indonesia. The ex-
change rate of the Indonesian rupiah in terms of the U.S. dollar is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in both equation (3a), with export growth rate as the de-
pendent variable, and (4a), with domestic inﬂation rate as the dependent
variable. None of the three selected explaining variables have an eﬀect on
the change of domestic interest rate, as shown in equation (2c).
5.4 Capital Inﬂows under a Basket Peg System
5.4.1 A Simulation Method
In this section, a simulation analysis of capital inﬂows is used to analyze
how a currency basket peg system would have inﬂuenced the capital in-
ﬂows. We then compare the capital inﬂows under the actual de facto dollar
peg system with results of the simulation. A currency basket peg system
means that the monetary authorities increase the weight on the yen and de-
crease the weight on the U.S. dollar in the currency basket to which the do-
mestic currency is pegged. A currency basket peg system is likely to change
the ﬂuctuations in exchange rates against the U.S. dollar and the yen.
We assume that coeﬃcients on the explanatory variables in the regres-
sion equations estimated in the previous section are unchanged even if the
monetary authorities change their exchange rate policy.7 If the currency
7. The Lucas critique tells us that the change in the exchange rate policy might change the
coeﬃcients in the estimated equations.
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basket peg system inﬂuences ﬂuctuation in exchange rates, it will certainly
change actual and expected change in exchange rates and the standard
deviations of exchange rates (foreign exchange risk) from the forecast. The
currency basket peg system should have a direct impact on exchange rate–
adjusted foreign interest rates via the expected changes in exchange rates.
Thus, it has direct eﬀects on capital inﬂows via the foreign interest rates
and the foreign exchange risk variables. Since we use an instrumental vari-
able method to estimate the regression equations, we can analyze not only
the direct eﬀects but also the indirect eﬀects that minor instrumental vari-
ables, such as the domestic interest rate and export growth rate, have on
capital inﬂows.
If the monetary authorities adopted the currency basket peg system in-
stead of the de facto dollar peg system, the weight on the U.S. dollar in a
currency basket would be lowered, and the weight on the yen would be in-
creased. Consequently, the exchange rate of the domestic currency against
the U.S. dollar would ﬂuctuate more, and the exchange rate of the domestic
currency against the yen would ﬂuctuate less.
Assuming that the monetary authorities stabilize the exchange rate of
domestic currency against a currency basket consisting of only the U.S.
dollar and the yen, we come up with the following equation:
(6) hc/ usd hc/ yen0 1= + −  s s( )
where shc/usd is the rate of change in the exchange rate of the domestic
currency against the U.S. dollar, shd/yen is the rate of change in the ex-
change rate of the domestic currency against the yen, and  is a weight on
the U.S. dollar in a currency basket.
From equation (6), we can obtain the following equation:
(7)
hc/ usd
hc/ yen
1 −
= −




s
s
.
Supposing that the actual weight on the U.S. dollar is 0.8 (  0.8), the
ratio of the ﬂuctuations in the exchange rates of the domestic currency
against the U.S. dollar to the exchange rate of domestic currency against
the yen would be 1:4. If the monetary authorities decreased the weight on
the U.S. dollar in a currency basket to 0.5, the ratio of ﬂuctuations in
exchange rate would be 1.
Assuming that the changes in exchange rate ﬂuctuations are equally di-
vided into both the changes in exchange rate ﬂuctuations against the U.S.
dollar and against the yen, we take a square root of the change in the
ﬂuctuation ratio to calculate the changes in exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
Under the currency basket peg system, ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate of
the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar would be doubled, whereas
ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate against the yen would be halved.
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In addition, we assume that the foreign exchange risks, which are sup-
posed to be deviations from the forecast value, would be changed in the
same direction as ﬂuctuation of the exchange rate. Therefore, foreign ex-
change risks of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar would be
doubled, whereas foreign exchange risks of domestic currency against the
yen would be halved under the currency basket peg system.
5.4.2 Results of the Simulation Analysis
Figures 5.14 through 5.18 show results of the simulation analysis for the
capital inﬂows to each of the three countries. Movements in simulated val-
ues as well as actual values and estimated values of capital inﬂows are de-
picted in these ﬁgures. Estimated values are calculated by using the re-
gression equations (1b), (1e), (1g), (1i), and (1k). Simulated values under
the currency basket peg system are compared with estimated values under
the de facto dollar peg system.
Simulated values for the “other investments” of Thailand are calculated
by substituting supposed values of the ﬂuctuations and deviations of the
exchange rates into the regression equations (1b), (2a), and (5a). Equations
(1e) and (2a) are used to calculate simulated values for the “portfolio and
other investments” of Thailand. Equations (1g), (1i), and (2b) are used for
Korea. Equations (1k), (2c), (3a), and (4a) are used for Indonesia.
In the cases of the “other investments” and the “portfolio and other
investments” of Thailand, the simulated values of capital inﬂows are
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Fig. 5.14 Other investments: Thailand (ratio against GDP)
Fig. 5.15 Portfolio and other investments: Thailand (ratio against GDP)
Fig. 5.16 Other investments: Korea (ratio against GDP)
Fig. 5.17 Portfolio and other investments: Korea (ratio against GDP)
Fig. 5.18 Other investments: Indonesia (ratio against GDP)
smaller than the estimated values during the analyzed period as shown in
ﬁgures 5.14 and 5.15. Moreover, when we focus on the capital inﬂows in
the 1990s, gaps between simulated and estimated values are large in 1991
and 1995 when surges of capital inﬂows to Thailand occurred.
Table 5.5 shows that means of simulated values are smaller than those
of estimated values—especially, the simulated values of the “portfolio and
other investments” are signiﬁcantly smaller than the estimated values.
Thus, it can be concluded that the currency basket peg system would have
had a depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to Thailand.
Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show the case of the “other investments” and the
“portfolio and other investments” of Korea, respectively. The simulated
values of capital inﬂows are smaller than the estimated ones during the
analyzed period, except for some quarters in 1995. Table 5.5 also shows
that means of simulated values are smaller than means of estimated values
in Korea. Although the gaps are not as large as the gaps in Thailand, it
still proves that the currency basket peg system would have had a de-
pressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to Korea.
The actual capital inﬂows to Thailand were larger than the estimated
values in both 1991 and 1995. The actual capital inﬂows were also larger
than the estimated values during the period in 1996 for Korea. This fact
implies that factors other than interest rates and foreign exchange risks
had substantial eﬀects on a surge of capital inﬂows during the mentioned
period.
In the case of Indonesia, the simulated values of capital inﬂows were
smaller than the estimated values during the analyzed period, although
diﬀerences between them are small. Table 5.5 shows that means of simu-
Table 5.5 Means and Standard Errors of Estimated and Simulated Values for Thailand,
Korea, and Indonesia
Thailand Korea Indonesia
Portfolio Portfolio
Other and Other Other and Other Other
Capital Flows Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments
1986Q1–1997Q1
estimated 0.0528 0.0646 0.0025 0.0116 0.0195
(0.0318) (0.0332) (0.0182) (0.0264) (0.0060)
simulated 0.0178 0.0237 0.0164 0.0140 0.0175
(0.0558) (0.0633) (0.0251) (0.0393) (0.0053)
1990Q1–1997Q1
estimated 0.0720 0.0856 0.0089 0.0272 0.0158
(0.0118) (0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0178) (0.0036)
simulated 0.0544 0.0653 0.0017 0.0050 0.0141
(0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0166) (0.0316) (0.0028)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Q1  ﬁrst quarter.
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lated values are smaller than those of estimated values also in Indonesia,
although they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Thus, the currency basket peg
system would only have had a slightly depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows
to Indonesia.
The results of the simulation imply that the currency basket peg system
would have had a depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to both Thailand
and Korea and only a slightly depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to Indo-
nesia during the analyzed period.
5.5 Conclusion
East Asian countries that suﬀered the currency and ﬁnancial crises had
adopted a de facto dollar peg system. The de facto dollar peg system
tended to extend ﬂuctuations in trade balances of the countries as pointed
out by Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998). In this paper, special attention is
paid to the eﬀect that the dollar peg system has on capital accounts. We
empirically analyzed how the de facto dollar peg system stimulated capital
inﬂows to Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia before the crises.
We conducted a simulation analysis of the impact on capital inﬂows to
the countries under a currency basket peg system. From the regression
analysis of the actual capital inﬂows, we found that responsiveness of capi-
tal ﬂows to the foreign exchange risk against the U.S. dollar is much larger
than responsiveness of capital ﬂows to the foreign exchange risk against
the yen in the case of Thailand and Korea. From the simulation analysis,
we obtained the result that the currency basket peg system would have
had a depressing eﬀect on capital inﬂows to Thailand and Korea.
The asymmetry in the responsiveness to foreign exchange risks against
the U.S. dollar and against the yen would have decreased capital inﬂows
under the currency basket peg system. In other words, capital inﬂows were
stimulated more through stable exchange rates against the U.S. dollar un-
der the dollar peg system. Thus, we conclude that capital inﬂows would
have been more stable under the currency basket peg system.
The following questions remains as an agenda for the future: What other
factors explained the oversurges of the capital inﬂows? We tried to explain
the oversurges of capital inﬂows using several explanatory variables, in-
cluding export growth rate, stock prices, and the interest rates as well as
the foreign exchange risks. Further attempts need to be made to discover
other possible factors. Deregulation of capital inﬂows by the domestic
monetary authorities is an important factor; we set it up as a deregulation
dummy variable when estimating the capital ﬂow equations. Other exter-
nal factors such as speculative pressures from abroad may also be good
candidates.
Another question is whether the coeﬃcients in the capital ﬂow equation
could in fact be kept constant if the monetary authorities were to switch
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their exchange rate regime. In this paper, we assumed that they would be
kept constant if the currency basket peg system were the one to be adopted
in these countries. In addition, historical data and time series models were
used to estimate the expected exchange rates and the foreign exchange
risks. It implies that investors did not take into account the possibility of
a future switch of regime when forming their expectations.
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Comments Francis T. Lui
The main issue raised by Ogawa and Sun is what would have happened to
capital inﬂows in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea had they adopted a bas-
ket peg system. These countries had adopted a de facto dollar peg during
the sample period, but Japanese bank loans to them were signiﬁcantly
higher than those from the United States. It seems to make sense if their
currencies were at least partially pegged to the yen. From the policy per-
spective, it is therefore of interest to measure the eﬀects on capital inﬂows
if the Japanese yen had a larger weight in determining the exchange rates
in these countries.
The authors have proceeded in two steps to answer this question: one
step based on regression analysis, the other on counterfactual simulations.
There are therefore two sets of results that need to be discussed.
The authors ﬁrst attempt to measure the eﬀects of several determinants
of capital inﬂows (as a share of GDP). These include, among others, the
home country’s interest rate, exchange rate–adjusted U.S. interest rate, ex-
change rate–adjusted Japanese interest rate, and foreign exchange risks of
Francis T. Lui is professor of economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Tech-
nology.
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